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IN THE SUPRE;ME COURT
of the
ST.ATE OF UTAH
KARNA HELD,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vsAMERICAN LINEN
PANY, a corporation,

Case No.
8513
SUPPLY

COM-

Defendant and Appelant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

PRELIMINARY -STATEMENT
All Italics are ours throughout this brief. The Plaintiff and Respondent will be referred to as plaintiff. Defendant and Appellant will be referred to as defendent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent accepts the stat,ement of facts contained
in the brief of the Appellant as far as it recites the procedural matters which have occurred before the trial court.
However, there are many important details of t,he Master
Agreement and of the Arbitrator's opinion which were
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not discussed in the statement of facts and which Respondent believes should be contained in a statement of facts.
The collective bargaining agreement appears at
pages 44-48 of the record. It is a typical collective bargaining agreement with many of the objects and articles
which are commonly found in such agreement.
One of the most important portions of the agreement
is contained in Article I. There the agreement states
that:
"The objects of this agreement, and the aims
and intentions which the parties are desirous of
attaining are:
(a) To effectuate a spirit of fair dealing between employer and employee.
(b) To bring about and establish a high order
of discipline and efficiency by tl1e intelligent cooperation of employer and employee.
(c) To provide for adjustment of all matters
subject to arbitration by procedure hereinafter set
forth."
Article II of the agreement contains a no strike clause,:
Article III contains a provision that the company will
not suspend, discipline, discharge or discriminate against
any employee for lawful union activities. Article IV describes the employees and the portions of the employers
business which shall be governed by the collective barSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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gaining agreement. Article V provides for union recognition, Article VI provides for union security and grants
what is in effect a union shop provision. Article VII provides for check-off of union dues and Article VIII provides for seniority. It reads as follows:
"The Company agrees in lay-offs and rehiring
of employees to observe the principle of departmental seniority wherever reasonable in the light
of efficiency. The Company, however, to be the
judge of qualifications in such matters. In applying seniority, the employer shall take into consideration length of service, merit and ability of
t,he employee."
Article X provides for arbitration and reads as follows:
"All controversies as to the interpretation and
application of this master agreement that cannot
be settled by the representative of the employer
and the Union, within the period of one week from
the date that the grievance is called to the attention of the other party in writing, shall submit
the matter for decision to a Board of Arbitration
to be constituted as hereinafter set forth:"
Article XI grants to the union a right to access to
the plant for the purpose of investigating any grievances
which may arise. Article XII provides for a shop steward
on the upstairs division and the downstair division and
the two shop stewards and the president of the Union
constitute a grievance committee. Article XIII provides
for leave of absence for personal reasons. Article XIV
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provides for uniforms and places the obligation of furnishing them upon the employer. Article XV grants to the
female employees of the Union leave of absence in case
of maternity and provides such leaves shall be granted
without loss of seniority. Article XVI, entitled "Termination," provides for the ways in which the Master Agreement shall be terminated or shall come to a natural end.
The Master Agreement was in effect at all times
during the employment of plaintiff. She was the president of the Local Union. As president she was a member
of the grievance committee.
Plaintiff was discharged on December 2, 1954. There
was assigned as a cause for her discharge "insubordination
and uncooperativeness." The discharge and surrounding
circumstances were made the subject of a complaint by
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local Union 562.
Pursuant to the agreement the matter was submitted to
the Honorable William H. Leary as sole arbitrator. However, the parties were not able to agree upon the matter
to be arbitrated and Mr. Leary was required to frame
issues for submission to him for arbitration.
The decision of the arbitrator was submitted to the
trial court and was considered by him in reaching his
decision and making the memorandum opinion. It is
found on pages 49-55 of the record.
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5
The arbitrator's decision contains a recital of the
occurrences prior to the submission of the rna tter for
arbitration.
The issue in dispute is set forth as follows ( R. 50) :
"Was the discharge of Karna Held on December
2nd, 1954, by the Company in violation of Article
III of the contract between the parties?"
It was the position of the Union that plaintiff had
been discharged because of her union activities as a member of the grievance committee and as president of the
Local.
The company's position was that she was discharged
for insubordination and uncooperativeness, with regard
to her duties as one of the shop stewards.
The Arbitrator made his findings of fact and as a
part of the findings he found that plaintiff, during the
time that she was president of the local union and on
the grievance committee had presented a number of
grievances on behalf of the individual employees. A portion of the grievances which she discussed with the employer were the discharges of Ida Gertz and Darlene
Fowler.
The discharge of plaintiff occurred after she had
presented a grievance concerning overalls which were
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assigned to some of the girls whose normal work involved
only the pressing of gowns.
The decision of the Arbitrator indicates that plaintiff
had been in the employ of defendant for five years eight
months, <R 50), that she was one of the most efficient
operators in the room and the company had no complaints with her works, <R 52).
The conclusions of the Arbitrator were that the dispute between the company and plaintiff was one which
was covered by the Master Agreement and over which
the Arbitrator had jurisdiction. But the issue was restricted to the question, of whether or not plaintiff was
discharged for lawful union activity, <R 53).
Mr. Leary states in his conclusions the following,
<R 53):
"The decisions of the present arbitrator should
not in any way be construed as foreclosing or
prejudicing her rights to proceed in a court of law
against the company for discharge without 'just
cause ' " .
At another point in his conclusions, the Arbitrator
states as follows, <R 54):
"The weight of the evidence substantiated the
Company's contention that Mrs. Held ,vas discharged for alleged insubordination and uncooperativeness. Whether or not the Company did, or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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can, substantiate such justifications is another
matter not involved in t,his dispute."
The decision of the Arbitrator then reads as follows:
"The Arbitrator Decides:
1. That the objection of Counsel for the
Company that the Arbitrator has no jurisdiction
to decide the present dispute concerning the discharge of Karna Held, because the contract between the parties has no provision relating to discharges, is overruled.
2. The discharge of Karna Held on December 2, 1954, by the Company was not in violation
of Article III of the contract between the parties."
After the decision of the Arbitrator plaintiff commenced her action against the defendant and alleged
that she had been wrongfully discharged and that the
defendant terminated her employment without "just
cause" and contrary to the contract of employment which
Is entitled "Master Agreement".
At the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss for
lack of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the
trial court asked for the submission of briefs. The briefs
were submitted and the matter re-argued.
It was determined that under the t,erms of the Master
Agreement and the interpretation that had been given
to it by the arbitrator defendant, plaintiff and the Union,
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plaintiff's right under the contract, was for continuing
employment which could not be terminated without
"just cause".

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE

MASTER AGREEMENT BETWEEN AMERICAN LINEN
SUl~PLY CO. AND A'MALGAJM~TED CLOTHING WORKERS LOCAL
UNION 562 GRANTS TO THE WORKERS OF AMERICAN LINEN
SUPPLY COMPANY A RIGHT TO CONTINUING EMPLOYMENT
WHICH CAN ONLY BE TERMINATED FOR JUST CAUSE.

POINT II.
THE ARBITRATOR'S OPINION INTERPRETED AND APPLIED TilE
MA!STER AGREEMENT AND IS BINDING UPON BOTH PARTIES TO
THIS ACTION, IT DETERMINED THAT PLAINTIFF HAD A CONTINUING RI GHT OF EMPLOYMENT TERMINABLE ONLY FOR JUST
CAUSE.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE MASTER AGREEMENT BETWEEN AMERICAN UNEN
SUPPLY CO. AND AMALGM1ATED CLOTHING WORKERS LOCAL
UNION 562 GRANTS TO THE WORKERS OF AMERICAN LINEN
SUPPLY COMPANY A RIGHT TO CONTINUIN·G EMPLOYMENT
WHICH CAN ONLY BE TBRMINATED FOR JUST CAUSE.

A careful examination of the Master Agreement will
reveal that the American Linen Supply Co. and the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local Union 562 agreed
that the employees of American Linen Supply Co. would
be granted a right to continuing employment, that this
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right to continuing employment would not be son1ething
which could be arbitrarily and capriciously terminated
by unilateral action of the employer.
If the position of defendant is correct the collective
bargaining agreement has no substance whatsoever. It
is an illusory agreement. Any time defendant desires to
cease to be governed by the provisions of the Master Agreement it could arbit~rarily and capriciously terminate the
employment of all members of the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers Local Union 562. If it had a right to discharge
which it could exercise arbitrarily whenever one of its
employees was obtaining that degree of seniority which
gave to the employee a right to certain types of preferred
employment, the employment of such an employee could
be terminated. The same would be true as to the maternity rights which are granted to the employees. Whenever an employee sought maternit~y leave her employment could be terminated and no grounds would need be
recited for the termination.
It is submitted that an interpretation which defendant seeks would reduce the Master Agreement to anullity and is therefore one which is absurd and cannot,
as a consequence, be the interpretation which was intended by the parties to the agreement.
If the defendant has the right to arbitrarily and
capriciously discharge its employees who are members
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of the local union, that would not promote the objects
which are set forth in Article I. A right to arbitrarily
and capriciously discharge, is not a right which would
effectuate a spirit of fair dealing between the employer
and the employee.
A right to arbitrarily and capriciously discharge
employees would not bring about and establish a high
order of discipline and efficiency by the intelligent cooperation of employee and employer. It would defeat the
second objective set forth in Article I of the agreement.
Certainly a right to arbitrarily and capriciously discharge employees would defeat the objects of sub-paragraph (c) which provides for adjustments of all matters
by arbitration.
On this particular matter 've need not remain in
doubt further than to examine the Arbitrator's decision,
for the Arbitrator has determined that the matter of the
discharge of an individual employee 'vas a fit subject for
arbitration under the terms of the agreement. Both
parties, now before this court, are bound by the Arbitrator's opinion. Within the four corners of the Arbitrator's decision, plaintiff respectifully submits there is
a further finding, that under the terms of the Master
Agreement, plaintiff cannot be discharged 'vithout "just
cause " .
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The basic contention of defendant is that because
there is no specific provision in the Master Agreement,
which categorically states that the company shall not
discharge without "just cause", none can be inferred. Such
a provision in collective bargaining agreements is not a
usual thing. A number of such agreements have been examined by boards of arbitration as well as by this court
and there was no specific provision against discharge .
without cause.
In Russell v. Ogden Union Railway and Depot Company, ________________ u ________________ 247 P.2d, 257, this court had
before it an example of a collective bargaining agreement
which did not specifically provide that the individual
employee could not be discharged without cause. Within
the four corners of the agreement, however, there was
provisions for a hearing on grounds cited for discharges.
It was determined by the court that an employee had
a right to continuing employment and could not be discharged without just cause.
It would appear that both parties to collective bargaining agreements have assumed that the employer was
not claiming or attempting to reserve his right to arbitrarily and capriciously discharge an employee. As a
consequence, the most obvious of the provisions was not
placed in the agreement. Such was the situation in the
Russell case.
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The right of an employee where a collective bargaining agreement which does not, by its terms, specifically
set out and provide that the employee shall not be discharged without good and sufficient cause, has been before
a number of Boards of Arbitration. One of the most enlightening of such decisions is: In re The Atwater Manufacturing Company, United Steel Workers of America.
Local 3456, C./.0., Case No. 133-4950-150, December
7, 1949, 13 L.A. 747 decided by the Connecticut State
Board of Mediation and Arbitration composed of Joseph
F. Donnelly, Mitchell Sviridoff and W. Stuart Clark.
The company, in the Atwater case took the position;
( 1) that the collective bargaining agreement by its terms
provided that only disputes as to the meaning and application of the terms of the agreement are arbitrable;
(2) no agreement is arbitrable unless it is processed in
accord with the grievance procedure. Under position
( 1 ) , the basic question 'vas whether or not a discharge
of employees was an arbitrable dispute or grievance. The
employer contended that it was not and the union contended that it was.
The company claimed that discharges are not arbitrable since the agreement provides only for the arbitration of disputes as to the meaning and application of
the agreement and the agreement has no clause covering
discharge. The union claimed, as does plaintiff, that if
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the employer has the right to arbitrarily discharge his
employees, many of the most, important provisions of the
agreement have little meaning. The Board of Arbitration
accepted the union's position and stated that no sound
argument could be made against it because if the company by a unilateral decision may discharge without restriction or protest the company could also violate many
of the provisions of the agreement without restriction or
protest by simply discharging this or that employee. As
a result the seniority clause would not have any meaning
whatsoever and there would be no restriction of any
effect as to lay-offs. The company, by simply discharging
this employee or that employee when it chooses and without regard to cause, could discharge those employees
with the highest seniority rating and in effect completely
disregard the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The Board of Arbitration stated its
position in the following language:
"If the Company can discharge without cause,
it can lay off without cause. It can recall, transfer,
or promote in violation of the seniority provisions
simply by invoking its claimed right to discharge.
Thus to interpret the agreement in accord with
the claim of the Company would reduce to anullity the fundamental provisions of a labor-management agreement- the security of a worker in his
job."
The defendant,, in the present case, argues that there
is nothing in the written collective bargaining agreement
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which specifically covers the company's right to discharge
or any restrictions on that right. The same thing was
true in the Atwater case and the Board of Arbitrators in
discussing and disposing of such contentions stated as
follows (p.749, 750):
"In view of the above, it is difficult to accept
the company's claim that since the agreement
contains no expressed limitation of managements
discretion in the rna tter of discharges, its action is
not reviewable under the grievance procedure.
Such a provision either explicit or implicit is seldom found in the collective bargaining agreement
today.
"The fact is that the agreement does not, in
specific language, confer on management the right
to discharge at will, nor does it, by specific language confer upon the union the· right to process
discharges under the grievance procedure. Hence,
the dispute here is not one as to the application of
specific terms of the agreement but rather a dispute as to the meaning of the provisions in the
agreement and as such by mutual agreement of
the parties properly, it is within the jurisdiction
of the Board. This point deserves further discussion."
The Board then discussed the nature of collective
bargaining agreements and the restrictions that such an
agreement placed both on the employees' rights and on
the employer's rights and then as its conclusion, it stated
as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"In the instant case, the Company claims an
unlimited right to discharge. The basis of its
claims is that the agreement does not state that
the company does not have this right. The fact
is, however, that in the agreement both the company and union have agreed on definite employee
rights, which rights would be meaningless if they
did not necessarily imply a severe modification of
the company's right to discharge. We must consider the agreement to be logical and consistent and
we must conclude that the parties deliberately
worked for that logic and consistency in drawing
the agreement.
"Thus, the explicit terms of the agreement by
establishing rights which are wholly inconsistent
with the claims of the company must logically be
considered to have modified any claimed rights
which are not fairly expressed and which are inconsistent with the explicit terms of the agreement.
In the face of that conclusion, the claim of the
company will not stand."
The decision of the Board of Arbitrators then quoted
extensively from a prior decision written by one Saul
Wallen and a part of the portion of his decision quoted
reads as follows (p.750):
"In our opinion, the meaning of the con tract,
(collective bargaining contract), w.hen viewed as
a whole is that a limitation on the employer's
right to discharge was created with the birth of
the instrument. Both the necessity of maintaining
the integrity of the contract's component parts
and the very nature of collective bargaining agreements are the basis for this conclusion. Inasmuch
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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as this limitation is an implied term of the contract, discharges are subject to the grievance procedure and arbitration."
The decision of the Board of Arbitration was that
discharges are arbitrable grievances under the collective
bargaining agreement even though they are not specifically mentioned by the agreement, and further that the
contract which provides for seniority rights and worker's
security implied provides that the employer shall not have
an unrestricted, unlimited right to discharge without
cause.
An additional case on the question of a right of an
employer to discharge without cause, employees who are
under a collective bargaining agreement is In re Standard
Oil Company & Central States Petroleum Union, Western Michigan Petroleum Association, Local 103,- Case
No. 50A-129, April 12, 1950, 14 L.A. 516. This decision
was made by a three man Board of Arbitration under the
laws of the State of Michigan. The Board of Arbitration
had to consider the question of whether or not the company was within its right in discharging certain employees
and whether or not the company is required to submit the
question of their discharge to arbitration. As stated in
the decision of the Board, the question was as follows:
Whether or not where the current contract is entirely
silent on the question of discharges, the company's right
to relieve an e1nployee from its service with or without
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cause rests exclusively with management and its action
in respect thereto is challengable.
The Board of Arbitration points out in the decision
that the company had followed practice of not discharging
its employees without good and sufficient cause.
It will be noted that in the decision of the Arbitrator, Mr. Leary recites the fact that the defendant assigned
a cause for the discharge of plaintiff and on two other
occasions, when discharges were made of employees, they
were the subject of grievance procedures. Plaintiff herself, as president of the Union, had discussed with American Linen grievance officials the discharge of two employes, namely, Ida Gertz and Darlene Fowler, (R 51).
Plaintiff submits that both the employees and the
employer have followed a uniform course in the interpretation of the Master Agreement. The employees have
always claimed that they had a right to continuing employment which could not be terminated without just
cause. The defendant, has recognized that claim because
it has never attempted to discharge without cause.

~:

~~

it
~~

~~~
~

An additional decision out of the State of Connecticut
and from the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration
is In re Whitney Chain Company, United Automobile
Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 199, C.I.O., Case No. 5354-705, March 16,
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1955, 24 L.A. 385. There, the Board of Arbitration held
that the company's right to discharge was a proper subject for arbitration. That the company did not have a
right to discharge without cause, even though there was
no specific term which prohibited the company from discharging without cause. The decision was made in the
face of a claim by the management that the right of discharge was one vested exclusively in the management and
therefore, not subject to arbitration. The Board decided
that there must be proper cause shown by management
before a discharge can be upheld. An additional decision
from a Board of Arbitration is In re Pilot Freight Carriers,
Inc., International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, C.I.O. 391,
A.F.L., No. 1, June 21, 1954, 22 L.A. 761. A three member Board of Arbitration in Pennsvlvania rendered the
following decision ( p. 761 ) :
"Despite absence of contract clause requiring
that discharges be for just cause, the employer
may not discharge "~itl1out just cause, since one
of the passive assumptions underlying every collective bargaining agreement is that employer will
not arbitrarily exercise his power to discharge."
In addition to the clain1 that the tern1s of the Master
Agreement did not give to plaintiff a right to any job
security whatsoever nor any protection against arbitrary,
capricious and \villful discharges, defendant clain1s that
there is no right under the Master Agreement to arbiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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trate or even consider controversies arising out of wrongful discharges. Their positjon is that Article X, entitled
"Arbitration", does not cover wrongful discharges. Article X states:
"All controversies as to the interpretation and
application of this Master Agreement that cannot be
settled by a representative of the employer and the union,"
etc. shall be submitted to arbitrators.
On very similar language it has been held that cause
for discharge was a matter subject to arbitration. Lee
Farris v. Alaska Airlines Inc., 32 L.A. 3547.
The United States Supreme Court has held that an
agreement which provided that the rights of discharged
employees could not be arbitrated violates the National
Labor Relations Act. The inclusion of such a provision
in a contract is an unfair labor practice. Defendant now
contends and asks this court to hold that an agreement
which does not, by its specific terms, prohibit arbitx-ation
on discharges does so by inference. See National Licorice
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 U.S. 350,
60 S.Ct. 569.
The Supreme Court of the United States in the
National Licorice Co. case had before it a contract, which
had been entered into by a union dominated by the employer. The employer by the terms of the contract, re-
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quired each employee to agree not to demand a closed
shop or a signed agreement by his employer with any
union. The agreement contained language which prohibited collective bargaining or arbitration with respect
to the discharge of employees. It provided that a discharged employee could submit to his employer a statement indicating that h.is discharge was unreasonable. Then the
agreement stipulated that the question as to the propriety
of an employee discharge could in no event be one for
arbitration or mediation (60 S.Ct 575).
Justice Stone specifically stated that such a provision in a collective bargaining agreement was an unfair
labor practice. A later circuit court case interpreting and
applying the National Licorice Co. case is Inland Steel
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board of United Steel
Workers of America, C.I.O. et al, v. National Labor Relations Board, 170 F.2d 247. In clear and unequivocal
language, the decision sets forth the background and
philosophy behind the Supreme Court decision (p.252):
"The Supreme Court, in National Licorice Co.
V. N.L.R.B., 390 U.S. 350, 360~ 60 S.Ct. 569, 84
L.Ed. 799, held that collective bargaining extends
to matters involving discharge actions and, as
already noted, the Company in its contract with
the Union has so recognized. We are unable to
differentiate between the conceded right of a
Union to bargain concerning a discharge, and particularly a nondiscriminatory discharge of any employee and its right to bargain concerning the age
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at which he is compelled to retire. In either case,
the employee loses his job at the command of the
employer; in either case, the effect upon the 'conditions' of the person's employment is that the
employment is terminated, and we L~ink, in either
case, the affected employee is entitled under the
Act to bargain collectively through his duly selected representatives concerning such termination."
The decision also contains language which is the
very heart of the argument now presented by plaintiff
to the court. In the decision, in discussing job security
and whether or not such important rights are subjects
which can be protected, the Seventh Circuit Court states
as follows ( p .252) :
"The Company also concedes that seniority is
a proper matter for collective bargaining and, as
already noted, has so recognized by its contract
with the Union. It states in its brief that seniority
is 'the very heart of conditions of employment.'
Among the purposes which seniority serves is the
protection of employees against arbitrary management conduct in connection with hire, promotion,
demotion, transfer and discharge, and the creation
of job security for old workers. * * *"
Even in plaintiff's case defendant did not claim an
arbitrary, capricious right to discharge without cause.
It set forth a cause and claimed that the cause of her discharge was "Insubordination, Uncooperative to Supervision".
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The three discharges of which we have evidence
show a consistent, uninterrupted practice by defendant
under this collective bargaining agreement. Discharges
are not made without cause. Only when there exists just
cause did defendant claim a right of discharge. The union
and the employer have mediated, arbitrated, discussed
and considered the claimed cause for discharge and have
specifically resolved the difference as to whether or not
the discharge was merited and whether or not the cause
actually existed for such discharge in two of the three
cases.
Plaintiff considers the rights which she is claiming
in this matter to be those of the greatest importance to the
laboring man. Rights to job security from day to day
as long as loyal and efficient services are rendered is the
very foundation of all seniority rights.
An employee who works for years at one job establishes a prior right to that job and builds for his protection seniority rights. These seniority rights are earned
through the years of service tendered and received by the
employer and if there is a right to arbitrarily, cap1iciously
and without cause to discharge such an employee~ the
whole field of seniority rights would be completely des-

troyed.
If an employer can discharge without cause \Yhat
good would years of loyal and faithful service do for an
employee? At the capricious and arbitrarv \Yill of his
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employer all his rights could be destroyed and he
could be thrown back on the labor market without the
benefit of a preferred place in industry and possibly at
an age where further employment or new employment
would be impossible to obtain. Certainly, the objects of
the Master Agreement would not be sustained, promoted
or in any way assisted if the court rules that under the
Master Agreement the employer can arbitrarily and capriciously discharge his employees.

~:

It is impossible for plaintjff to believe that the defendant seriously claims that a right to arbitrarily and capriciously discharge any employee without any cause is
calculated "to effectuate a spirit of fair dealing between an
employer and employee" or that such a right would
"bring about and establish a high order of discipline and
efficiency by the intelligent cooperation of employer and
employee" or would it tend "to provide for adjustment
of all matters subject to arbitration by the procedure herein set forth". Certainly, it would not "increase the standards of workmanship and conduct so as to insure fair
and proper quantjty, quality and cost of production."
Such a right would completely destroy rather than promote the standards of the linen supply industry in the
City of Salt Lake and vicinity. It would destroy any respect that the employee group as a whole would have
for the industry and would in that way destroy the patronage and respect of the public for the industry.
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What benefit can any employee receive from the
clause prohibiting the discharge for lawful union activity
if no cause is needed for discharge. The cases seem uniformly to recognize the principles that when an employer
is called upon to show that an employee is discharged
not for union activity only by coming forward with
another cause, can the employer sustain his discharge?
If the discharge is for no cause, that is if the discharge is
not for some disciplinary purpose, then restoration of
employment or damages is recognized by all the decisions.
See Russell v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra;
National Labor Relations Board v. Ford, et al, 170 F.2d
735.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Superior Co.,
199 F.2d 39, the court stated the principle in the following language:
"It is conceded by the Board that the Act does
not interfere with the normal exercise of the right
of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them for an}· reason except union activity
or relationship. If a discharge is not arbitrarily
made with a purpose. or as a11 excuse, to avoid
the statute, it is not unla,vful. N.L.R.B. v. Jones
& Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1, 45~ 57 S.Ct. 615~ 81 L.Ed.
893; N.L.R.B. v. Tennessee Coach Co., 6 Cir.,
191 F.2d 546, 550. The employer's right to hire
and fire includes the rigl1t to make reasonable rules
and regulations and to discipline employees for
violation thereof. N.L.R.B. v. Mylan-Sparta Co.,
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6 Cir., 166 F.2d 485, 491; N.L.R.B. v. Thompson
Products, 6 Cir., 162 F.2d 287, 300. But the discriminatory enforcement of a rule against an en1ployee engaged in union activities will cause a
court to inquire carefully into the facts to determine whether the action taken against the employee was in reality because of his violation of
the rule or because of his union activities. N.L.R.B.
v. Ford, 6 Cir., 170 F.2d 735, 738-739. The Board
contends in the present case that the real reason
for the disciplinary action taken against the five
members of the Union Committee was their union
activities rather than their violation of the order
prohibiting them from taking the day off to attend
the conference at Dayton. If the refusal of the
Respondent to grant the requested leave of absence
was valid, disciplinary action which followed for
a violation of the order was not improper. However if the refusal to grant the requested leave of
absence was invalid under the Act, the disciplinary
action which followed was likewise invalid.* * *"
It is respectfully submitted that within the four
corners of the Master Agreement the right is afforded
to the plaintiff for job security and protection is given
her against arbitrary and capricious discharges. That
as a consequence she should have the right to have a jury
determine, in a court of law, whether or not there has
been any grounds for her discharge or whether or not
it is arbitrary and capricious and without just cause.
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POINT II.
THE ~RBtiTRATOR'S OPINION INTERPRETED AND APPLIED THE
MASTER A:GR!BEMENT AND rs BINDIN'G U,PON BOTH PARTIES TO
THIIS A!CTION, IT DETERMI NED THAT PLAINTIFF_ HAD A CONTINU·ING RI,GHT OF EMPLOYlMENT TERMINABLE ONLY FOR JUST
1

CAUSE.

The Master Agreement is clear upon one part of
the rules governing the action between plaintiff and defendant. In Article X entitled "Arbitration" it states:
"All controversies as to the interpretation and
application of this Master Agreement that cannot
be settled by the representative of the employer
and the Union, within the period of one week
from the date that the grievance is called to the
attention of the other party in writing, shall submit the matter for decision to a Board of Arbitration to be constituted as hereinafter set forth":
Both the Union and defendant selected and agreed
upon Dean Leary as the Arbitrator. They did not set
forth in writing as is usually the case, the question to be
settled by arbitration. However.. the n1atter ,,-as submitted to the Arbitrator. The decision of the Arbitrator
concerning the dispute 'vhich ""as submitted to him
certainly "rould be binding upon both the defendant and
the Union and if binding upon the Union is binding
upon plaintiff.
The Arbitrator, because of the dispute between the
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bitrated resolved that matter in a clearly worded paragraph under the title "The Issue in Dispute" (R 50).
There he states that the question in issue was the following:
"Was the discharge of Karna Held on December
2nd, 1954 by the Company in violation of Article
III of the contract between the parties".
Article III forbids discrimination against employees
and discharge for Union activity. Dean Leary found the
discharge was not for Union activity, but specifically
reserved the right of plaintiff to have the question of
whether or not there was "just cause" for her discharge
submitted to a court of law where that particular question
could be decided.
This conclusion of the Arbitrator reads as follows:
(R 53)

"The decision of the present Arbitrator should
not in any way be construed as foreclosing or prejudicing her right to proceed in a court of law
against the company for a discharge without 'just
cause' ".
The Arbitrator not only was interpretating Article III
of the Master Agreement but also interpreted the agreement in its overall purpose. The opinion and specifically
that portion of the conclusion of the Arbitrator which is
quoted shows beyond possible dispute that the arbitrator
found plaintiff could not be discharged without "just
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cause." An interpretation and application of the Master
Agreement gave to her a right of continuing employment
which could not be terminated except for just cause.
It is respectfully submitted that the defendant cannot now claim that a new and different interpretation
should be placed on the Master Agreement. In the case
of Gionnopulos v. Pappas 80 U. 442 ISP2d 353, this
court held that both parties were bound by an arbitration
award and set forth the rule of law which should be
applied here. It is generally recognized that the award of
an Arbitrator acting within the scope of his authority
determines the rights of the parties to it as efficiently as
a judgment. It is as binding on the parties as a judgment
until its validity is questioned in some proper manner.
The law encourages persons ,vho 'vish to settle their
differences by arbitration as an inexpensive, speedy
n1ethod of adjudicating differences. A court "~ill not
review the actions of the arbitrator to correct errors or to
substitute its conclusion for that of the Arbitrator acting
honestly and within the scope of his authority. See: Bivons
v. Utah Lake. Land. Water. and Power Co. 53 Utah 601,
174 P 1126; Jacob v. Pacific Export Lumber Co. 136 Or.
622~ 297 P 848; Utah Construction Co. v. Western Pacific
Railroad Con1pany 174 Cal 156, 162P 631; 2 R.C.L. 389.
Both parties having subn1itted the agreement and
the grievance to the Arbitrator it is respectfully submitted
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that both parties should be required to give full faith and
credit to his opinion and should be bound to accept the
interpretation that he placed upon the Master Agreement.
He concluded that plaintiff has a continuing right of
employment which cannot be terminated without "just
cause."
CONCLUSIONS
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the
trial court should be affirmed that this court should declare that the Master Agreement between American Linen
Supply Co. and Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local
Union 562 grants to the individual workers a right to
continuing employment which can only be terminated
for just cause. That the court should then remand the
case to the trial court for further proceedings and for a
trial at which it shall be determined whether or not defendant had any just cause for discharging plaintiff.

Respectfully submitted,
DWIGHT L. KING

Attorney for Plaintiff
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